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THm RELEVANCE OF "UNION BENEFIT" TO PROSECUTIONS FOR
UNAUTHORIZED EXPENDITURES OF UNION FUNDS
United States v. Goad, 490 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1974)
Defendants, officers of Local 600 of the Teamsters Union,' received
salary increases upon the sole authorization of the Local president, de-
fendant Lane.2  Neither the Executive Board nor the general member-
ship of the Local approved the increases, although such approval was
required by the Local constitution. 3 For authorizing and accepting the
pay raises, defendants were convicted 4 of violating section 501(c) of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959i
(LMRDA). Defendants appealed, alleging that the prosecution had
failed to show that the union did not benefit from the pay raises.6 The
1. Defendant Goad was vice president of Local 600 of the International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Union); other
defendants were the president, secretary-treasurer, and recording secretary of the Local.
2. Lane authorized separate $50 per week pay increases for defendant officers on
May 24, 1969, October 18, 1969, and January 5, 1970. When appellants assumed their
offices in 1968, the annual salaries for Local officers were: president, $21,000; vice
president, $15,000; secretary-treasurer, $19,600; recording secretary, $17,700. By 1971
the salaries were: president, $36,133; vice president, $33,311; secretary-treasurer,
$38,742; recording secretary, $33,728. United States v. Goad, 490 F.2d 1158, 1160 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 945 (1974). The court did not explain the source or valid-
ity of the salary increases other than those for which defendants were prosecuted.
3. Section 7.02(b) of the Local's constitution requires the Executive Board of the
Local, made up of the president, vice president, secretary-treasurer, recording secretary,
and three other trustees, to "[aipproved [sic] the salaries, benefits, allowances, direct
and indirect disbursements, expenses and reimbursement of expenses for officers, agents
and employees." Brief for Appellants at 34 n.8, United States v. Goad, 490 F.2d 1158
(8th Cir. 1974). Section 6.09 of the constitution requires an officer to perform execu-
tive or administrative functions as authorized or directed by the general membership.
Since one executive function might be to fix the level of officer compensation, the mem-
bership, as well as the Executive Board, could exercise control over officers' salaries. Id.
at 33-34 & n.7.
4. 490 F.2d at 1159-60.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1970) provides:
Any person who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully abstracts or
converts to his own use, or the use of another, any of the moneys, funds, se-
curities, property, or other assets of a labor organization of which he is an
officer, or by which he is employed, directly or indirectly, shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
6. 490 F.2d at 1161. Defendants also contended that there was proper authoriza-
tion for their salary increases since a general membership resolution gave the local pres-
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Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed and held: Lack of
benefit to the union is not a necessary element of a violation of section
501(c) of LMRDA. 7
In response to discoveries of widespread corruption in the internal
management of many American labor unions,8 Congress enacted the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 19591 to insure
lawful and democratic control of labor organizations. 10 Section 501 of
the LMRDA 1" concerns union officers' fiduciary duties' 2 to union mem-
bers: subsection (a) establishes and defines the fiduciary duties;13 sub-
ident and secretary-treasurer "'authority . .. to make such expenditures and use of
Teamsters Local 600 funds and facilities to whatever extent they believe is related to
the interests and benefit of Teamsters Local 600 without any prior approval."' Id.
(quoting resolution). The court held that the membership resolution could not "be read
as rescinding the specific constitutional provision requiring Executive Board approval of
salary increases." Id.
7. United States v. Goad, 490 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 945
(1974).
8. The discoveries were made by the Senate Committee on Improper Activities in
the Labor and Management Field. See note 10 infra. For a concise but perceptive
analysis of the background of the LMRDA, see Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions
Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MicH. L. REv. 819 (1960). See generally
Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 46 VA. L. Ru'v.
195 (1960).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970). This statute is also referred to as the Landrum-
Griffin Act.
10. For a collection of excerpts from the legislative history of the LMRDA, see 2
U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 2318-514 (1959). Unfortunately, the legislative history
of § 501 gives no help in determining the elements of a violation of § 501 (c). For
a general discussion of issues raised by the LMRDA, see Naumoff, Landrum-Griffin and
Regulation of Internal Union Affairs, 18 IA. L.J. 387 (1967).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1970). For the text of the section see notes 5 supra, 13-14
infra.
12. The classic statement of the nature of a fiduciary relationship was given by
then-Chief Judge Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545,
546 (1928):
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at
arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held
to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone,
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of be-
havior.
A fiduciary has the duty to act solely for the benefit of the beneficiary, and to comply
strictly with the terms of the trust defining his powers and duties. See note 33 infra.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1970) provides:
The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor or-
ganization occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its
members as a group. It is, therefore, the duty of each such person, taking into
account the special problems and functions of a labor organization, to hold its
money and property solely for the benefit of the organization and its members
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section (b) creates civil liability for violation of the duties;14 and sub-
and to manage, invest, and expend the same in accordance with its constitution
and bylaws and any resolutions of the governing bodies adopted thereunder,
to refrain from dealing with such organization as an adverse party or in behalf
of an adverse party in any matter connected with his duties and from holding
or acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the inter-
ests of such organization, and to account to the organization for any profit re-
ceived by him in whatever capacity in connection with transactions conducted
by him or under his direction on behalf of the organization. A general excul-
patory provision in the constitution and bylaws of such a labor organization
or a general exculpatory resolution of a governing body purporting to relieve
any such person of liability for breach of the duties declared by this section
shall be void as against public policy.
The courts have not agreed on the extent of the fiduciary duties imposed by § 501 (a).
Some courts have held that the subsection applies to union officers only in the manage-
ment of the union's financial affairs and assets. E.g., Coleman v. Brotherhood of Ry.
Clerks, 340 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1965); Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1964);
Puma v. Brandenburg, 324 F. Supp. 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Richardson v. Tyler, 309 F.
Supp. 1020 (N.D. Ill. 1970). Other courts have construed the subsection more broadly.
E.g., Hood v. Journeymen Barbers Union, 454 F.2d 1347, 1354 (7th Cir. 1972) ("every
area in which subversion of the interests of the union membership may be accomplished
by union officials or representatives bent on acting in culpable derogation of those inter-
ests"); Johnson v. Nelson, 325 F.2d 646, 653 (8th Cir. 1963) (refusal to pay members'
attorney fees and related expenses although authorized by majority vote of local mem-
bers); Moschetta v. Cross, 48 L.R.R.M. 2669 (D.D.C. 1961) (failure and refusal to
complete arrangements for and call special convention); cf. Woody v. Sterling Alum.
Prods. Inc., 244 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Mo. 1965), aff'd, 365 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1966);
Highway Truck Drivers Local 107 v. Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa.), a!f'd, 284
F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961). See generally H.R. REP.
No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); Clark, The Fiduciary Duties of Union Officials
Under Section 501 of the LMRDA, 52 MINN. L. REv. 437 (1967); ACox, supra note 8;
Dugan, Fiduciary Obligations Under the New Act, 48 GEo. L.J. 277 (1959); Note, The
Fiduciary Duties of Union Officials Under the LMRDA: A Guide to the Interpretation
of Section 501, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 486 (1962).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1970) provides:
When any officer, agent, shop steward, or representative of any labor organi-
zation is alleged to have violated the duties declared in subsection (a) of this
section and the labor organization or its governing board or officers refuse or
fail to sue or recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate
relief within a reasonable time after being requested to do so by any member
of the labor organization, such member may sue such officer, agent, shop stew-
ard, or representative in any district court of the United States or in any State
court of competent jurisdiction to recover damages or secure an accounting or
other appropriate relief for the benefit of the labor organization. No such pro-
ceeding shall be brought except upon leave of the court obtained upon verified
application and for good cause shown, which application may be made ex
parte. The trial judge may allot a reasonable part of the recovery in any ac-
tion under this subsection to pay the fees of counsel prosecuting the suit at the
instance of the member of the labor organization and to compensate such mem-
ber for any expenses necessarily paid or incurred by him in connection with
the litigation.
For cases construing this subsection, see Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 853 (1972); Phillips v. Osborne, 403 F.2d 826 (9th Cir.
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section (c) makes the embezzlement of union assets by union officers
or employees a crime.15 Prosecutions under subsection (c)'" have
generally focused on union officers' use of their positions for personal
gain rather than for the benefit of the union.1  In several of these
cases, benefit to the union has implicitly been recognized as a defense
to a prosecution under section 501(c)' 8 and as evidence disproving the
fraudulent intent of the officers.' 9
United States v. Goad denies that benefit to the union has any rele-
vance to section 501(c), and limits the elements of a violation of the
section to an unauthorized expenditure of union funds and an intent
1968); Homer v. Ferron, 362 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 928 (1966);
Teamsters Union v. Hoffa, 242 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1965); Nelson v. Johnson, 212
F. Supp. 233 (D. Minn. 1962), aff'd, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963).
15. For the text of § (c), see note 5 supra.
16. The collection of various offenses in § 501(c), see note 5 supra, has not been
a source of controversy. The courts have held that § 501(c) creates a new federal crime
of embezzlement of funds from a labor organization, but to the extent that terms with
established meanings are used, those meanings are still applicable. Colella v. United
States, 360 F.2d 792 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 829 (1966); Woxberg v. United
States, 329 F.2d 284 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 823 (1964). It was the intent
of Congress in drafting the statute to avoid technical definitions whereby guilty persons
could escape liability by slipping through the crevices between the so-defined crimes.
United States v. Harmon, 339 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944
(1965). See also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
The Government is not required to specify which of the individual crimes the defend-
ant has committed. United States v. Dibrizzi, 393 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1968); Colella
v. United States, supra; United States v. Harmon, supra; Woxberg v. United States, supra;
Doyle v. United States, 318 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1963).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Vitale, 489 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1974) (union-owned
automobile sold to dealer and resold to union official at reduced price); United States
v. Ferrara, 451 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972) (spending
union money for automobile for officer's private use; using expense account for personal
purposes); United States v. Silverman, 430 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 953 (1971) (embezzlement of proceeds of employee welfare fund; misuse of union
funds in awarding "Christmas gratuities"); United States v. Dibrizzi, 393 F.2d 642 (2d
Cir. 1968) (payment of personal expenses not involved in union business); United
States v. Brill, 350 F.2d 171 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 973 (1965) (issuance of
false expense vouchers to increase officers' salaries); United States v. Harrelson, 223 F.
Supp. 869 (E.D. Mich. 1963) (causing checks to be drawn on union funds for delivery
to another for political purposes).
18. United States v. Ferrara, 451 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1032 (1972); Colella v. United States, 360 F.2d 792, 804 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 829 (1966).
19. United States v. Silverman, 430 F.2d 106, 115 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 953 (1971).
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to defraud the union.20  The court declared that both the legislative
history and prior judicial interpretation of section 501 required that sub-
section (c) be broadly construed21 to insure that union officers fulfill
their fiduciary duties.22  The court reasoned that requiring the prosecu-
tion to prove lack of benefit to the union would unduly burden the Gov-
ernment and thereby emasculate the Act.23  Noting that the case was
one of first impression in the Eighth Circuit,24 the court found that the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had dealt with subsection (c),
but had not construed it to require a showing of lack of union benefit. 5
20. 490 F.2d at 1166.
21. "Congress intended that [the Act] should not be interpreted ... narrowly or
strictly, but, to the contrary, that its confines are broad." Johnson v. Nelson, 325 F.2d
646, 650 (8th Cir. 1963); accord, Pignotti v. Local 3, Sheet Metal Workers, 477 F.2d
825, 832-35 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973). H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1959) provides a broad definition of the fiduciary duties of union
officers. See also note 13 supra.
22. 490 F.2d at 1162. The court observed that "[t]he conduct of these defendants
cannot by any stretch of the imagination or by the use of sophisticated semantics be
raised to the level of conduct required of fiduciaries. . . ." Id. at 1165.
23. Id. at 1165.
24. Id. at 1163. The court referred to previous Eighth Circuit cases which consid-
ered § 501(c) violations but did not discuss the elements of the offense. E.g., United
States v. Bryant, 430 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1970); Hayes v. United States, 329 F.2d 209
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 980 (1964); Doyle v. United States, 318 F.2d 419
(8th Cir. 1963).
25. The Second Circuit had specifically discussed lack of union benefit as an ele-
ment of § 501(c), but had not definitively established the elements of a violation of
the subsection. United States v. Silverman, 430 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 953 (1971). Judge Friendly, writing for the court on some counts, believed
that "it is doubtful whether a payment made in a bona fide belief that it was for a
union's benefit and that it had been authorized or would be ratified can ever be swept
under 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) . . . ." Id. at 127 (dictum).
Judge Moore, in dissent, stated:
Decisions finding violations of ... section 501(c) have also emphasized the
elements of appropriate union benefit and proper union authorization ...
It is clear that when there is no possible union benefit from the use of the
union funds made by the official, it makes no difference whether the use was
authorized.
Id. at 114. He also argued that "a conviction under section 501(c) may be made out
by a demonstration of a fraudulent intent to deprive the union of its funds and either
a lack of bona fide authorization or an absence of benefit to the labor organization from
the expenditure." Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
In United States v. Ferrara, 451 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032
(1972), the court, in reviewing the evidence leading to the defendant's conviction, said:
"By its verdict of guilty the jury found that appellants, without authority and for per-
sonal purposes, entered into long-term auto leases for themselves and their Union
friends." Id. at 96. The court later stated, in relation to another § 501(c) count, thai
"[t]he first defense to this charge was that the dinners were for Union business, but
805
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The court further observed that similar felonious-taking statutes do not
require a showing of lack of benefit to the owner of the property.20
The court finally concluded that the elements of the offense were pres-
ent in Goad because the defendant had intentionally disregarded
proper authorization procedures for increasing officers' salaries. 27
The court's advocacy of a broad construction of section 501(c) is of
questionable validity. While it is true that some cases have held that
section 501 should be broadly construed in determining the nature of
the officers' duties,2 those cases involved civil liability under subsection
(b), not criminal liability under subsection (c). Furthermore, the
prior cases concerned whether the fiduciary duties extended to activ-
ities other than management of the union's finances, not whether the
duties could be expanded to prohibit acts relating to finances that did
not damage the union. In announcing a policy of broadly construing
the entire section, the court ignored one maxim of statutory construc-
tion, that penal statutes should be strictly construed unless there is sub-
stantial evidence of legislative intent to the contrary.20  Subsequent
there was evidence that they were merely social occasions." Id.
In United States v. Dibrizzi, 393 F.2d 642, 645 (2d Cir. 1968), the court said:
"mhe Government adduced at the trial enough evidence from which the jury could
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the items were personal non-business ex-
penses and in no way incurred in furtherance of the union's business."
Thus, while the Goad court was correct in asserting that the Second Circuit had not
conclusively established a lack of union benefit as an essential element of a § 501(0)
offense, one Second Circuit case (Silverman) had indicated that it would sometimes be
an element, and two cases (Ferrara and Dibrizzi) had indicated that the Government
gave evidence of a lack of union, benefit. The latter two cases had also implied that
if the expenditures were for the benefit of the union, that fact would have been a valid
defense.
26. 490 F.2d at 1165, citing 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1970) (embezzlement, theft, or con-
version of public money, property, or records); id. § 645 (embezzlement by court offi-
cers and employees of money which comes into their possession by virtue of their posi-
tions); id. § 654 (embezzlement or conversion of property of another by officers or em-
ployees of United States); id. § 655 (theft by bank examiner); id. § 656 (theft, embez-
zlement, or misapplication by bank officer or employee); id. § 657 (same, by employees
of various federal credit, lending, and insurance institutions); id. § 658 (same, of mort-
gaged property by officers or agents of farm credit agencies); id. § 659 (theft from inter-
state shipments via common carrier); id. § 660 (theft or embezzlement by president, di-
rector, or officer of any firm engaged in interstate commerce); id. § 661 (theft of per-
sonal property within United States maritime and territorial jurisdictions); 15 U.S.C. §
80a-36 (1970) (embezzlement of assets of registered investment companies).
27. 490 F.2d at 1166.
28. See cases cited note 13 supra.
29. ee United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (Marshall,
C.J.):
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courts may rely on the policy of broad construction to justify attaching
criminal liability to behavior not usually considered criminal. 30 This
is particularly unfortunate because it is not clear that the Goad court
broadly construed subsection (c) to reach its decision.3 1
The court emphasized that the defendants' conduct constituted a
breach of their fiduciary duties.3 2  By holding that any benefit to the
union was immaterial, the Goad court followed the general rule that,
if a fiduciary breaches the terms of his trust, he is liable whether or
not his breach caused an incidental benefit to the beneficiary.3 3 How-
Mhough penal laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to be construed
so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. The maxim
is not to be so applied as to narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion
of cases which those words, in their ordinary acceptation, or in that sense in
which the legislature has obviously used them, would comprehend.
See generally 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATtrES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 59.01-.08
(4th ed. C. Sands 1974).
30. It is impossible to forecast the particular results that a policy of broad construc-
tion may have in subsequent decisions. Perhaps courts will use Goad as the basis for
criminalizing any behavior which generally resembles embezzlement or conversion, or
behavior which seems inconsistent with the standard of behavior required of a fiduciary.
In so doing, courts may neglect to make the hard decisions concerning whether a defend-
ant's conduct satisfies, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the necessary elements of em-
bezzlement.
3 1. After announcing that broad construction was necessary to hold officers to their
fiduciary duties, the court did not explain how the policy of broad construction was ap-
plied in this particular context. If the court simply meant that it agreed with prior
courts' views of the breadth of the fiduciary duties, see note 13 supra, then the language
regarding broad construction was unnecessary because defendants' conduct involved fi-
nancial management and would fall within the scope of § 501(a) even under a narrow
interpretation.
Perhaps by "broad construction" the court meant that no criminal conduct should go
unpunished simply because it does not fit within the specific definitions of any of the
specified crimes in subsection (c). Such an approach could be justified under the ra-
tionale of United States v. Harmon, 339 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 944 (1965), see note 16 supra, but it is submitted that this involves simply finding
the congressional intent and not broadly construing the statute.
32. 490 F.2d at 1163, 1165-66. Although the point was not an issue in the case,
and therefore was not resolved by the court, it seems obvious that defendants did in fact
breach their fiduciary duty to the union since they made expenditures without obtaining
authority in accordance with the Local's constitution and bylaws.
33. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 343 (5th ed.
1973). A somewhat useful analogy to the union officers' fiduciary duties may be found
in corporation law, with respect to the fiduciary duties of corporate directors and offi-
cers. While the corporate directors are nominally subject to a rule of undivided loyalty,
courts often recognize that an officer or director may benefit both himself and the corpo-
ration through a particular transaction. The ultimate fairness of the transaction is be-
coming the dominant standard for judging whether an interested director may retain the
benefits of the transaction. N. LATrriN, Tm LAw OF CORPORATIONS 290-94 (2d ed.
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ever, it is not clear that subsection (c) incorporates the fiduciary duties
of subsection (a)," and several cases have affirmed convictions for em-
bezzlement without reference to the fiduciary duties."5 Construing
section 501 as a unit, the Goad court held that the principles applicable
to civil liability for breach of fiduciary duties in the expenditure of
union funds are also applicable to embezzlement. This conclusion may
seem logical, given that embezzlement can only occur in a fiduciary
context.3 6 There is a danger, however, that the line drawn by Congress
between civil and criminal liability will be blurred,37 so that any ex-
1971); cf. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 465-70, 502-03 (2d ed.
1970).
Nevertheless, the general rule remains that any fiduciary has a duty to act solely for
the benefit of the beneficiary. See, e.g., Page v. Natural Gas & Fuel Co., 35 F.2d 462
(8th Cir. 1929); Thompson v. Hays, 11 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1926); White v. Sherman,
168 Ill. 589, 48 N.E. 128 (1897); Hardwick v. Cotterill, 221 Ky. 783, 299 S.W. 958
(1927); In re Johnson, 187 Wash. 552, 60 P.2d 271 (1936); In re Carlson, 162 Wash.
20, 297 P. 764 (1931); RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TRusrs § 170(1) (1959). But cf.
id. comment a (emphasis added): "A trustee is in a fiduciary relationship to the bene-
ficiary and as to matters within the scope of the relation he is under a duty not to profit
at the expense of the beneficiary. .. ."
A trustee must also comply strictly with the terms of the trust defining his powers
and duties. See, e.g., Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. Humphreys, 97 F.2d 849 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 628 (1938); Darrow v. Van Buskirk, 57 Ariz. 1, 110 P.2d
216 (1941); Bryson v. Bryson, 62 Cal. App. 170, 216 P. 391 (Dist. Ct. App. 1923);
Eaker v. Husbands, 263 Ky. 283, 92 S.W.2d 43 (1936); cf. Young v. Hood, 209 N.C.
801, 184 S.E. 823 (1936); Crayton v. Fowler, 140 S.C. 517, 139 S.E. 161 (1929).
34. See United States v. Sullivan, 498 F.2d 146, 148 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1974); Doyle
v. United States, 318 F.2d 419, 423 (8th Cir. 1963). Other cases which relied on the
concept of the fiduciary relationship also recognized union benefit as an exculpatory fac-
tor. See, e.g., United States v. Ferrara, 451 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1032 (1972); United States v. Silverman, 430 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 402 U.S. 953 (1971); Colella v. United States, 360 F.2d 792 (1st Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 829 (1966); ef. United States v. Harrelson, 223 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Mich.
1963).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Dibrizzi, 393 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1968); United States
v. Brill, 350 F.2d 171 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 973 (1965); Woxberg v. United
States, 329 F.2d 284 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 823 (1964).
36. Moore v. United States, 160 U.S. 268, 268-70 (1895); United States v. Silver-
man, 430 F.2d 106, 126-27 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953 (1971); Colella
v. United States, 360 F.2d 792, 799 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 829 (1966); Doyle
v. United States, 318 F.2d 419, 423 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v. Harrelson, 223
F. Supp. 869, 870 (E.D. Mich. 1963).
37. The essence of the court's reasoning was that the defendants spent union funds
without obtaining authorization in accordance with the Local's constitution. Civil liabil-
ity for that particular breach of the officer's fiduciary duties, however, is provided for
in § 501(b). If Congress had intended the same breach of duty to constitute a § 501
(c) offense, then Congress should have been more explicit in relating subsection (c)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/9
Vol. 1974:801] EXPENDITURES OF UNION FUNDS
penditure without authorization in accordance with the union's constitu-
tion or bylaws will constitute a section 501(c) violation.38
Although fraudulent intent is the most important element of a section
501(c) offense,39 the Goad opinion gave that element only superficial
attention. In contrast to United States v. Silverman,40 the court did not
acknowledge that benefit to the union may have some probative weight
on the fraudulent intent issue.4 1  Goad suggests that if union officers
knowingly disregard proper procedures, a fraudulent intent to deprive
the union of its funds may be inferred.42  A more satisfactory analysis
could be made by identifying the primary intended beneficiary of
the defendants' acts. If a union officer, knowing that he has no bona
fide authorization, spends union funds primarily for the benefit of the
union and in fact does benefit the union, then it would be illogical to
to the other subsections. The legislative history of § 501, see note 10 supra, does not
suggest such a close relationship, and it is not illogical to argue that Congress prescribed
different kinds of liability for different kinds of culpable conduct. This is not meant
to suggest that for certain conduct both types of liability might not result.
38. The court conceded only two defenses to an unauthorized expenditure: mistake
and accident. 490 F.2d at 1166. For an argument that, in some circumstances, an offi-
cer should not be criminally liable even when he knows that he has no authorization,
see note 43 infra and accompanying text.
39. This is true because (1) there is no defense recognized for fraudulent intent as
there is for lack of authorization, see note 38 supra; and (2) under United States v.
Silverman, 430 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953 (1971), fraudulent
intent is the one element that must always be proved, see note 25 supra.
40. 430 F.2d 106, 115 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953 (1971); see note
25 supra. In a recent case, the Second Circuit held in more explicit terms that benefit
to the union would be strong evidence that an officer did not have a fraudulent intent,
even if he knew that the expenditures were not authorized. United States v. Ottley, No.
74-1731 (2d Cir., Jan. 7, 1975).
41. The court said:
[T]o allow a showing of union benefit to vitiate fraudulent intent in a case
involving unauthorized expenditures would allow union officials to handily
evade the broad fiduciary provisions of § 501(c) and the essential elements of
a § 501(c) violation.
. IN]or is a showing of benefit relevant to disproving fraudulent intent
to deprive the union of its funds where the disbursement was unauthorized.
490 F.2d at 1166.
42. Id. at 1166 & n.10. Defendants charged in their petition for rehearing that
the Court's opinion on this issue has inadvertently established the patently er-
roneous precedent that intentional violation of a union by-law (relating to dis-
bursement of funds) is exactly the same as intentional violation of a federal
embezzlement statute, and therefore that 501(c) becomes a strict liability crim-
inal statute, rather than one which requires specific fraudulent intent, in all in-
stances where the disbursement was unauthorized under the union by-laws.
Appellants' Petition for Rehearing at 3, United States v. Goad, 490 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir.
1974).
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hold that simply because the expenditures were not authorized, the of-
ficer must have intended to defraud the union.4" On the other hand,
if an officer intends to and does benefit himself, then any incidental
benefit to the union would rightly be considered immaterial.44  The
Goad opinion may be criticized for not making that distinction clear,
even though in this particular case, the personal benefit to the defend-
ants was considerable while the benefit to the union was only argu-
able.415 It is unclear whether the court would hold that union benefit
is irrelevant if the benefit were more substantial and direct.
Goad represents a more rigid enforcement of union officers' duties
than existed prior to the decision. Its policy of broadly construing sec-
tion 501 as a unit, its definition of the offense by reference to the strict
standard of conduct required of fiduciaries, and its apparent approval
of an inference of fraudulent intent from knowing disregard of proper
authorization procedures should deter misconduct by union officers and
employees. Such an effect would be a desirable consequence of the
case. This result would be more commendable if the court's reasoning
were less open to criticism.
43. See notes 18 & 19 supra and accompanying text. Generally, good faith negates
fraudulent intent. State v. Parker, 112 Conn. 39, 151 A. 325 (1930); Brown v. State,
92 Fla. 538, 109 So. 438 (1926); People v. Parker, 355 Ill. 258, 189 N.E. 352 (1934);
W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CiiNuAL LAw § 89, at 652 (1972).
All facts and circumstances bearing on defendant's fraudulent intent are admissible
as a defense. State v. Smith, 48 Idaho 558, 283 P. 529 (1929); People v. Barrett, 405
Ill. 188, 90 N.E.2d 94 (1950); People v. Heilemann, 362 Ill. 322, 199 N.E. 792 (1936);
State v. Rives, 193 La. 186, 190 So. 374 (1939); State v. Larson, 123 Wash. 21, 211
P. 885 (1923); State v. Smith, 117 W. Va. 598, 186 S.E. 621 (1936).
Precedent exists, therefore, for recognizing a real and substantial benefit to the union
as a possible defense. By ruling out the possibility that union benefit could ever be a
defense to an unauthorized expenditure, the court seems to have gone beyond the re-
quirements of either precedent or reason in order to protect a union's assets from mis-
use by union officers.
44. See 490 F.2d at 1163.
45. The only benefit to the union which the defendants alleged was that the defend-
ants were working a greater number of hours than required. Brief for Appellants at
43, United States v. Goad, 490 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1974).
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